

On the Production of Peace

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Abstract: In this lecture I discuss reasons why there is no ready market for peace in which to purchase the absence of conflict. Although there are no ready remedies, it is observed that most of the world lives, most of the time, in peace and some prerequisite conditions are identified.

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Introduction

It must be said up-front: I am not going to propose a solution to the problem of how to secure peace within or across nations.¹ Instead, in this lecture I will outline economists' thinking about global public goods and how we think about the production of peace in particular. I will start by explaining what a public good is and how it contrasts to a private good. I will then look at the underlying conditions that makes the production of private goods possible and the production of a public good – such as peace – so difficult. I will, however, end on a somewhat optimistic note with regard to the production of peace.

Peace as a public good

In the universe of economics, any good, any product, any service is characterized by two features. First, how much more does it cost to provide the good to an additional user? And, second, can the additional user feasibly be excluded from using the good?

A famous example is that of building and operating a lighthouse. Suppose that I build a lighthouse to secure safe passage into harbor for my ships. I bear the cost of building and operating the lighthouse, and I obtain the benefit. Fair enough. Now, how much more does it cost to provide the lighthouse service to additional users (ship captains)? The answer is that it costs nothing more since the lighthouse is already operating. Can I exclude ships that are not mine from using the lighthouse beam? No, not really. Indeed, I may not even know that there are other ships orienting themselves by the light that my lighthouse provides. So, even though it has been privately built, my lighthouse is therefore a *public good*, i.e., a good that can accommodate additional users without causing additional costs *and* from whose use these additional beneficiaries usually cannot be excluded. A public good therefore refers not to characteristics of production, but to characteristics of consumption. In my example, the lighthouse is a *privately provided public good* (Coase, 1974).

But there is a problem. Since they cannot be excluded, additional users have no incentive to pay for the service I provide. I am doing something for my own good, and there is a spill-over effect that lets others benefit at no expense to them. They are called free-riders. Now suppose that there is a benefit to me but that it is not great enough to warrant the expense of building the lighthouse. That is, I would rather incur the cost of having my ships only sail at daylight or I would rather incur the cost of losing the occasional ship at night than to incur the cost of building and operating the lighthouse. Everyone now, including myself, tries to free-ride on everyone else and the lighthouse does not get built at all. In this case, some form of government may step in, compel the payment of a tax or user-fee and use the proceeds to finance the lighthouse which then is a *publicly provided public good*.

Economists argue that peace is the quintessential public good (Kindleberger, 1986), and a major question is why there seems to be so little of it. Why is peace not privately or publicly provided more often than seems to be the case? Or, if it is provided, why does its supply seem so insufficient? Why is there no *market* in which one can buy peace within and among nations? And what are the alternatives, in the absence of markets, by which peace might be secured? What are the obstacles to procuring peace? And what are the benefits of war that might be sufficient to circumvent peace?

These are the kinds of questions I am addressing in this lecture. To begin, though, let me explain that peace is a public good.² Again, we need to look at the consumptive characteristic of the good. First, once peace is provided, additional beneficiaries impose no additional costs. For example, once there is peace

in Macedonia, there is no additional cost just because in addition to the various groups in Macedonia, Greece also enjoys the benefits of that peace. And, second, additional beneficiaries, such as Greece, cannot be excluded from enjoying the peace that might obtain in Macedonia. You cannot make Greece *not* benefit from a Macedonian peace. So, peace is a public good, however it is produced.

Peace, as a general social condition within and among nations, contrasts with the services that a private bodyguard provides. The service that a bodyguard provides is a private good because an additional person to be guarded would incur additional costs (namely, a second bodyguard). Moreover, unless you pay me for allowing my guard to protect you, I can exclude you from benefitting from my bodyguard because the guard is under contractual obligation with me.

The question, then, is how to procure peace. At the national level there usually exists a governing authority that can compel taxation to finance a police force with equal service available to all, whereas at the international level there is no corresponding governing authority to compel payment to finance an international police force. Does that mean that global peace is impossible without international taxation? No, not at all. We need to acknowledge after all that most of the world is most of the time peaceful. But what the lack of international authority to collect taxes for an international police force does mean is that peace may break down more easily, that such break-down may be more widespread, more severe, and longer-lasting in its consequences, and that peace may not as easily be restored.³ And this prospect requires us to think about the kind of questions I mentioned before: why is peace insufficiently provided? Why is there no market in which one can buy peace? What are the alternatives, in the absence of markets, by which peace might be secured? What are the obstacles to procuring peace? And what are the benefits of war that might circumvent peace?

I begin by examining key features of private markets and what it is that makes these features inoperable in the case of peace. In this way we can understand, perhaps, certain key elements required for the production of peace.

Markets, market failure, and government failure

The principles of property rights and enforceable contracts

Economists generally recommend that goods and services be provided via free, private, competitive markets. Free means that there is voluntary exchange, rather than coercion. Private means the absence of government intervention. And competitive means lack of monopolization. Despite large-scale anti-globalization protests that we have witnessed in recent years taking place around the world, as compared to various alternative arrangements of providing for people's needs and wants, free, private, competitive markets generally do the best job.

Among the prerequisites for the proper functioning of markets, however, are the existence of property rights and contract enforcement. I cannot offer for sale what is not mine. Therefore, property rights – including the right to own myself, the right to my own person and personal safety – need to be well defined. But property rights, by themselves, are not sufficient. For markets to function property rights must also be enforced. For example, you and I have the right to enter into (and exit from) a labor contract that says that in exchange for my rendering of labor services to you, you will compensate me by payment of a certain

monetary wage. Contract enforcement then means that society somehow has made adequate and credible provisions that prevent you from taking my work without payment and that prevent me from receiving wages without performing the contracted work. If either you or I believe that contract enforcement is not adequate or not credible, we are unlikely to enter into the labor contract in the first place. And both of us would suffer. We really would have liked to enter into a labor contract – I for the money, you for my work – but uncertainty about contract enforcement leads us not to do what otherwise we would have liked to do.

The principles of property rights and contract enforcement also apply to peace within and among nations. Unless peace treaties are adequately and credibly enforceable, we have no incentive to enter into a contract. But who will be the enforcer? In the absence of an external guarantor of security – which requires that the guarantor's benefits outweigh the attendant costs – contracts need to be self-enforcing. In the private market, it is possible to design self-enforcing contracts.⁴ But in the area of peace this is sometimes difficult or even impossible to arrange. Now suppose contracts can be enforced, either externally or by self-enforcement. A deeper question then is who has the right to conclude a peace treaty in the first place? Who has the right to negotiate? What legitimizes the parties to sit down and negotiate? Unless the contracting parties are viewed as legitimate – unless the right to negotiate and to enter into a binding contract has been bestowed on them – peace treaties are likely to be challenged. Some process of social sanctioning – by means of formal democracy or otherwise – is therefore a necessary condition for successful, stable peace treaties to work. A *pax Romana* is always fragile when it is imposed from outside upon those who ultimately have to live with the decisions others make for them.

Competitive break-downs

Even if property rights are secure and contracts enforced, markets still can fail to deliver the largest number of desired goods and services at the lowest possible price. There are a number of interacting and simultaneous reasons for this. First are so-called *competitive break-downs*. Lack of competition either among sellers or among buyers produces market power, i.e., the ability to extract a higher (lower) price for reduced (increased) quantities or qualities of goods and services. Competitive markets work so well because buyers can credibly threaten to buy from another supplier, and sellers can credibly threaten to sell to another customer. This is different in the case of war and peace. Usually, to resolve differences party A can only go to party B, and vice versa. The terms of a peace treaty, if it comes about at all, depends on the relative bargaining position of the parties involved and may hence favor one party over the other, possibly seeding the renewal of conflict in the future when the position of the advantaged party may have weakened or that of the disadvantaged party may have improved. One need only refer to the case of the defeated Germany following World War I or to the case of Angola in the mid-1990s. If instead of two players holding roughly fifty percent each of the “market,” there were say even five players holding about twenty percent each, then it would be much harder for any one of the five to keep fighting if the other four agree.

For example, in the case of Angola I am told that only recently efforts have been made to raise and bring in the church as a third actor, and it might yet be able to take a stand between MPLA and UNITA. Similarly, another actor is the world oil market. When the market was depressed, it put pressure on

Angola's government, when the market and oil revenues flourished some pressure was taken off the government. And the recent discussion over so-called "blood diamonds," although primarily referring to the disasters in Liberia and Sierra Leone, reflect an attempt to involve world diamond consumers as additional "parties." Granted, all these are tenuous, sometimes very tenuous, parties but my larger point here is to illustrate that if one somehow could increase the number of parties with vested interests in the conflict, the chances for achieving peace might be improved.

Information failure

A second form of market failure is due to *information failure*. Markets function well when information is plentiful, accurate, and timely, and when it can be processed. Markets do not function well when information is scarce, inaccurate, too late, or when it cannot be processed. Well-informed markets function under conditions of high certainty, or at least good risk-assessment. In contrast, ill-informed markets work under conditions of uncertainty. Unfortunately, the making of peace often operates under the latter conditions. Moreover, it is costly to make information more plentiful, more accurate, more timely, and to increase one's ability to process it, a cost that the parties may not be able to bear.

How, then, does one improve information? In well-functioning private markets people have an incentive to create new markets just for information. For example, associated with the financial markets are extensive markets for information about financial markets. That is, the needs of the participants in one market creates new markets. In the case of war and peace, sadly, this is not so. There is a need for good information about opponents relative strength in manpower, supplies, equipment, and financing. But the number of people who have an incentive to collect and supply this information is small, as is the number of potential buyers. The market is "thin." Moreover, it is a very risky market for as soon as peace is reached the market for conflict-related information collapses. This also discourages information improvements even though it is desperately needed. Indeed, it is very interesting to observe that as soon as an enforceable peace treaty *is* signed, outside parties such as news media, governments, and investor groups, immediately invest in information collection about the country and its business opportunities. For example, now there are tremendous amounts of information available on the former East-Central European Soviet satellite states.

Furthermore, instead of being happy to provide information so as to reassure potential business partners, in the case of war and peace, there are incentives to keep information hidden and even to create false information. So, I have no ready answer to my own question – how to improve information – but, again, the larger point I am making here is that if one is serious about the production of peace, one needs to think about information needs.

Externalities

Third, so-called *externalities* can lead to market failure. An externality is a spill-over effect from one market to another. A buyer and a seller in one market may impose costs or bestow benefits on buyers or sellers in other markets. For example, I am the "seller" of this lecture, and by your attendance fee you are the "buyers." Yet anyone can download my lecture from my web site, without paying any fee at all. Those people benefit at a cost of zero to them. Thus, my lecture, just like the lighthouse in my earlier example, is

a public good.

In what sense then can we speak of a market *failure*? It is a failure because those who benefit should pay – or else the lighthouse might not be built and a lecture not be given. Or, some lighthouses might be built, some lectures might be given but not all that would be built and would be given. The desired good will be underproduced. Similarly, peace between two fighting parties bestows benefits on their neighbors even though the neighbors do not pay for the benefits thus received. If they do not pay, conflict and war may continue longer than necessary and the desired product, peace, is underproduced. Just consider how much Africa has to gain from peace among its people, yet nobody pays for fighting to stop. Of course, paying is associated with ability to pay, and personal and national incomes in Africa are small. And those outside of Africa have no incentive to pay, either, because they are not neighbors and would not benefit nearly as much from peace in Africa. It is a tricky problem indeed.

Peace leads to *positive externalities* for neighbors. War imposes *negative externalities*, i.e., those who fight impose costs on their neighbors without compensating them. For example, the fighting in Rwanda in 1994 caused other countries to have to deal with huge refugee streams. The cost to the Congo for instance was that the Rwandan situation generated a war in the Congo that continues to this day.

What do economists recommend? We recommend the “internalization of the externality.” This is fancy talk and means that those who benefit from me should pay me, and that those who cause me harm should compensate me. Unfortunately, this usually requires an external authority, a government, to make you pay. In the case of the lighthouse, the government can collect a harbor fee from all ship captains using any of the country’s ports and then use the fee to finance lighthouses. But in the case of war, there *is* no external government or authority, there is no world policy force, there is no United Nations standing army ready to intervene. There are no permanent peacekeeping volunteer troops. There is not even a ready peacekeeping budget. Worse, those who wish to fight, *know* that there is no external authority to force and enforce peace which, therefore, is itself an incentive to start and to continue fighting. Or how many of you believe that the ten years of war in the Balkans would have happened if everyone there had reason to credibly expect that a NATO or UN army would immediately intervene at the first sign of trouble? How many of you believe that Angola would have seen twenty-five years of civil war if everyone there had reason to believe that an international police force would intervene in sufficiently forceful manner?⁵

Note that external intervention and peacekeeping services themselves are public goods as most nations free-ride on the peacekeeping services other nations provide. To be sure, voluntary security services by some nations for other nations are sometimes provided but often they are incomplete (Haiti), or are abandoned early (Somalia), or they come very late in the game (the Balkans). Often they do not come at all (Rwanda)!

Let me make another point regarding externalities. If I buy a new set of tires for my car, then this is a desired transaction between myself and the tire manufacturer. The undesired outcome are various forms of pollution in the manufacturing process for which, in the absence of government regulation, neither the manufacturer nor I have any incentive to pay. We would rather impose the cost of pollution on everyone else. Similarly, we need to learn to see war as a “desired” activity with undesirable side-effects, i.e., negative externalities. In this regard, the recent work of David Keen (e.g., 2000, 2001) in particular has encouraged us to understand the economic functions (the “desirables”) of war. War is not driven by irrational motives as is often asserted but is driven instead by fairly rational considerations of the benefits

I receive – regardless of the cost I impose on others. The problem is that no overarching authority exists, that there is no jurisdiction and legislation, no mechanism of accountability by which those who benefit from fighting wars are also made to pay for the negative externalities they cause. If they could be made to pay (to “internalize the externalities”), one presumes that their “desirable” action, war, becomes too costly and would cease. One way to make them “pay” is by bringing them before an international tribunal or court of justice but, despite some recent successes, this is still too inadequate to deter war-making.

Incomplete markets

Fourth, the existence of *incomplete markets* is a form of market failure. In an incomplete market, the benefits to buyers and sellers are greater than their respective costs and yet the transaction does not take place. For example, for most buyers the benefit of health insurance is greater than the risk and cost of illness. Similarly, if the risk can be adequately pooled, the companies selling insurance receive more in premiums than they would pay out in claims. Thus, both parties should benefit and therefore engage in voluntary exchange. And yet, well-functioning private health insurance markets are scarce. In the US, for example, 40 million people are uninsured. Another example is the market for loans for small businesses. The paperwork associated with making a \$10,000 loan is just as involved as the paperwork with making a \$100,000 loan or a one million dollar loan. Even though the small loan would be profitable, banks earn more on larger loans and therefore understandably are not overly interested in the market for small loans.

Incomplete markets also go back, in part, to information failures and difficulties in contract enforcement. For example, it is likely that a financial institution already has plenty of reliable information on million-dollar customers whereas it needs to generate information on small-scale borrowers. Thus, not only do small loans bring small rewards but they are more expensive to process and approve than big loans are. Further, while enforcing repayment of a \$10,000 loan may cost as much as enforcing repayment of a million dollar loan, it surely is worth more for the bank to go after the million dollar loan repayment. Thus, the economics are stacked against the small-loan market. The market is incomplete. In the extreme case, the market is not only incomplete but missing altogether.

From a global perspective, peace may be seen as another example of an incomplete market. Even though the benefits of peace are surely greater than its costs, peace is not universal. In the case of health-care and small loans, national governments can step in and provide assistance, financed from coerced tax-payment imposed either on the entire population or on certain segments. For instance, in the United States, government legislation makes banks themselves responsible – under threat of penalties – to “reinvestment” money in poorer communities. Thus, the tax here falls mainly on the banks. In contrast, at least some health-care access for the elderly is funded through generalized taxes imposed on all working Americans.

How does one create a “complete” market for peace? Again, I do not know the full answer. With regard to financing, it is perhaps worth noting that while all UN organizations need to raise their own funds, some have been more successful than others. UNICEF for instance is much better at raising private contributions than, say, UNHCR or UN peacekeeping.

Public goods

A fifth form of market failure concerns the *public goods* nature of peace that I already discussed. If peace is available to everyone, why should I pay for it? I might as well wait until somebody else has paid and then free-ride. The crucial issue then is to prevent people (nations) from free-riding. Somehow they must be made to pay for benefits received. In other words, we need a mechanism by which to exclude free-riders. We need to build a fence to prevent benefits from spilling over to non-payers. We need to have a *club* where only the paying members benefit. If exclusion is, at least partially, possible the resulting good is indeed called a *club good*. For example, while the *written text* of my lecture is in fact a public good available to all, without exclusion, on the Internet, my *speaking* here and your ability to *ask questions in person* after the conclusion of my speech, is a *club good* because those who did not pay the admission fee are excluded. We have built a fence. Only the members benefit.

With regard to war and peace, NATO may be thought of as a club good. It provides a common defense service which, once provided, is available to all its paying members simultaneously. Unfortunately, the exclusionary feature does not work perfectly; the fence is leaking. Switzerland, for instance, is not a NATO member, it does not pay a membership fee, and yet few would doubt that NATO would intervene if Switzerland were to face an attack on its national territory. Switzerland, in effect, receives considerable benefits at zero cost. It is a free-rider. Similarly, in the 1990s Balkan countries received peacemaking services from NATO at a lower cost than what it would have cost the Balkan countries to provide peace for themselves.⁶ (The underlying reason of course had less to do with helping the Balkans than with reducing the refugee streams into western Europe and reducing the risk of drawing NATO members Greece and Turkey into the melee. NATO, in a way, provided for its own “forward defense” by acting on someone else’s territory.

At any rate, the point here is that one way to think about peace and peacemaking is to think about the costs and benefits of club-making, i.e., of alliance formation. There is a great deal of economics literature on alliance formation (e.g., Sandler and Hartley, 1999, on NATO). Some alliances work reasonably well, others don’t. Part of the reason is that building alliances itself is costly – and, as we now know, everyone has an incentive to free-ride on others paying the cost. Thus, ECOWAS is not a particularly successful organization. In contrast, the Asian Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN’s common security arms, has done pretty well. The number of post-World War II conflicts among its members have been very few. Another, and interesting, example is that of Somalia. So long as there was a pretense of national government there were fierce factional fights and ultimately unsuccessful intervention attempts by outsiders. Now the conflict has died down and quasi-independent clans run sections of the country. These clans can be interpreted as “clubs,” operating independent of one another and providing benefits primarily to club members, in the various ethnic groupings and territories. Eventually, the clans may trade political favors with one another and a semblance of national governance and government may reemerge, as now already appears to be the case.

Government failure

I need to make an additional point. This is the need to emphasize that government cannot of course be

relied upon the redress market failure. After all, there also is such a thing as government failure. The form of intervention to redress market failures may make society worse off than leaving the original failure in place. For example, schooling may be made mandatory by law but whether it is best provided by public or private schools is a separate policy decision. Similarly, a government may be concerned about how to deal with the market for hard drugs (cocaine, heroin). One way is to criminalize, the other is to legalize, but regulate, the market. The type of intervention matters, and the wrong type of intervention can make things worse, i.e., result in a form of government failure, but I shall not pursue this topic here.⁷

Taking stock

By comparing the production of peace to the operation of private markets, we learn a number of lessons:

1. Despite numerous human rights declarations, there exists in fact no enforceable property right to peace; this is so because there is no outside, external guarantor available to credibly enforce a peace treaty (contract).
2. The lack of competition (usually only two parties) ensures conditions of bi-lateral monopoly. As a result, relative power determines the outcome, and it may not be stable.
3. Information failure (lack of plentiful, accurate, timely information) and lack of capacity to process information create uncertainty and inhibit the production of peace.
4. While peace produces positive externalities for neighbors, neighbors have no incentive to pay for peace, hoping that the other neighbors will pay first (free-rider problem). Similarly, even though war generates negative externalities (e.g., refugee streams), there usually does not exist an adequate mechanism to internalize the cost of war.
5. Peace is a good with an incomplete market: even though the total benefits outweigh the total costs, too little peace exists.
6. Peace is a global public good. Once provided, all people benefit and it is difficult and costly to create an exclusion mechanism. There are few ready incentives to contribute to the cost of provision, nor to the cost of exclusion. Therefore, peace is generally undersupplied.
7. To deal with the undersupply would require a sovereign taxing authority to compel contributions. At the international level this authority does not exist and at the national level – in the case of civil war – it is disputed.

In sum, we learn that the production of peace is a tricky proposition. There are too many market failures whose removal is difficult to achieve. There are no ready-made remedies that can be universally implemented. Or rather, if there are such remedies, we have not yet discovered them. However, I do not want to appear unduly pessimistic and repeat what I said earlier: most of the world lives, most of the time, in peace. There must, therefore, exist a set of conditions under which the production and reproduction of peace is possible and stable. Some of these have to do with the kinds of things I developed in this lecture: there must be legitimizing authority that sanctions negotiators; there must be vested interests who perceive benefits greater than the costs; there must be adequate payoffs for visionary leaders who want to change things for the better; there must be information; there must be monitoring of contract performance; there

must be accountability; there must be enforcement. So, we *do* know some of the principles involved – we just haven't put them fully together yet.

Creating private markets for peace and security

Finally, as a concluding aside, I said earlier that there is no market in which one can buy peace. That, actually, is not quite true. In 1995, in the US more than twice as much money was spent on private security services than on public security, and there were three times as many private policemen than there were public policemen (*The Economist*, 1997). Every industrial plant, every university campus, many hospitals and schools, nearly every in-door shopping mall has some kind of security service, often armed and with powers of arrest. Moreover, people buy alarm systems linked via private relay providers to public police stations. Many neighborhoods have erected walls around the compound, and the entrances are guarded. Contrary to public perception, there does in fact exist a reasonably active private market for security and therefore for "peace."

At the national level, similarly, there have been widely published instances of private security firms providing national security functions for African and Asian governments (e.g., Angola, Sierra Leone, and Papua New Guinea). It is indeed very common practice for private firms to provide a variety of security-related services even for the United States and governments of other NATO members. So, we need to be open to the idea that private firms may be able to fulfill "public" functions of peace and security. The issue is not whether peace is publicly or privately produced but under whose legitimizing authority it is produced (see, e.g., Brauer, 1999).

Notes

1. Peace is not equivalent to the absence of threat, which is one characteristic of security. The characteristics of, and similarities and differences between, peace and security is a topic for another lecture (on some characteristics of peace see, e.g., Schwank and Rohloff, 2001). Even though they are not synonymous, in this lecture I nonetheless use the terms peace and security as if they were.

2. In addition to public *goods* there are also public *bads*. A public bad is an undesired product that must be consumed and from whose consumption people cannot feasibly exclude themselves. War is an example. It affects many persons simultaneously, and the affected persons usually cannot exclude themselves from its ill effects.

People often do not realize that the list of public goods (desirables) and bads (undesirables) is very long. War and peace are only a part of this list. I list a few of them here (a longer list can be extracted for example from Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern, 1999). These include pollution, terrorism, disease control, postal services, weather forecasting, the availability of agreed-upon money, and financial stability. To shift from local to translocal, simply add a few relevant words:

Local/national public goods/bads

pollution
 terrorism
 disease control
 postal services
 weather forecasting
 money
 financial stability
 law ...
 and order

Translocal/global public goods/bads

transboundary pollution
 international terrorism
 control of international disease vectors
 International Postal Union
 global weather forecasting
 the Euro
 stability of the global financial system
 international courts ...
 and international/global peace and security

It is immediately obvious that many of the local (or “national”) public goods are in fact provided, and public bads avoided, while many of the global public goods are not provided, and the global public bads not avoided. We realize that the issue of the avoidance of war and the occurrence of peace is thus part of a much wider, and much more common, set of circumstances.

3. On international taxation for peace, see, e.g., Fischer (1997) and Mendez (1997).

4. Let me illustrate this with a personal example. The conference organizers paid my airfare from the US to Portugal ahead of time. Why did I not simply take the money and stay home? Why did I fly to Portugal and fulfill my part of the contract? The reason is that I have a reputation to lose! I would never again be invited anywhere. The potential loss of my reputation is worth more to me than the airfare, and so I fulfill my contract. Thus, I am policing myself, and the contract enforces itself.

5. As an aside, note that refugees can also bring benefits. During World War II for example, the scholars, scientists, and engineers fleeing the horrors of Nazi Germany eventually made great contributions to the United States. Ironically, the US government was reluctant to accept these refugees. Only the great devotion of fellow scientists and the private financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation in particular rescued many European scientists and found jobs for them in the US.

6. We can argue fiercely about the manner in which the peacekeeping services were provided but this does not detract from the larger point that NATO provided such services.

7. In the case of war and peace, for example, my belief is that NATO made a mistake in Kosovo in February 1999. The form of the intervention, an exclusive air-war, actually permitted Serbia to fully carry out its murderous policies. Instead of restricting the slaughter, NATO stimulated it.

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